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CONTRACT AS DELIBERATION 
BERTRAM LOMFELD* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Contracts are communication. “‘Will you give it?’ ‘I will give it.’ ‘Do you 
promise?’ ‘I do promise.’ ‘Do you pledge your faith?’ ‘I do pledge my faith.’ 
‘Do you guarantee?’ ‘I do guarantee.’ ‘Will you do this?’ ‘I will do it.’”1 What 
grounds the commitment of a contractual communication? Contract theory 
circles around the question of what is the “basis of contract.”2 Freedom, 
efficiency, reliance, and equality are perhaps the most prominent among a host 
of competing grounds. Even if one could separate a mere analytical question of 
how contracts are constructed,3 at least two opposing narratives remain: 
promissory and conventionalist theories. Contracts are often said to mediate 
pluralistic interests within and between modern societies. But the many worlds 
of contract theories are deeply divided themselves. 
The aim of this article is to construct an integral core for one pluralist theory 
of contract based on public reason. Its main task is to reconcile the promissory 
account of contract with a public dimension, which is inherent in efficiency, 
justice, and reliance theories of contract. The first step of that endeavor will be 
to reconstruct recent promissory contract theories as a turn towards public 
reason.4 The second step liberates conventionalism of its utilitarian chains and 
shows its plural normative core.5 Yet a foundationally pluralistic theory of 
contract needs even to break off with the dichotomy of deontological and 
consequentialist constructions. An integrated pluralistic theory must overarch 
intention and convention. Pluralistic theory needs a pragmatic procedural 
underpinning. 
The consequent response to foundational value pluralism is a deliberative 
contract theory.6 Under the deliberative contract scheme, contract is not 
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 1.  Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius 3.92, in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 163 (S.P. Scott ed., 1932). In Roman 
law this formal “stipulation” of words was only one of four common forms to enter into contract. The 
other three were transfer of things, written exchange, and consent. 
 2.  Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933). 
 3.  For a strict distinction between an “analytic” and a “normative question,” see chapters 3 and 4 
of STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 64-165 (2004). 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See infra Part III. 
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
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governed by one single ethical principle. No monistic answer can hope to 
explain the whole of contract law. Only a deliberative framework is capable of 
capturing the political battle between competing ethical principles. Individual 
freedom has the same normative weight as, for instance, fairness, security, 
efficiency, or social welfare. Such a deliberative reading of contract law is not 
only consistent with at least some promissory and conventionalist theories of 
contract. Taking the deliberative space of reasons as the foundation of contract 
theory, the conflict between intention and convention even blurs. The common 
element of contract might be seen as the existence of a special discursive 
commitment between the parties.7 Within these inferential practices of giving 
and asking for reasons, contract is an explicit promise of reasons.8 
The communicative theory of contract offers an integral framework for the 
exchange of plural normative reasons. It could offer a useful argumentative 
grammar for lawmakers, judges, and legal scholars. Because it refrains from 
preferential treatment of any substantive normative contract principle, it could 
even mediate between opposing camps of contract theory itself. Yet one 
normative conclusion persists: contract has lost its private innocence. Within a 
deliberative frame, contract never is completely private—it is a political 
institution. Every contract has an implicit public dimension of reasoning. 
II 
THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF PROMISING 
“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as 
a duty.”9 Continental lawyers stumble over section 1 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. For the common law tradition, “[t]he common element 
of all contracts might be said to be a promise.”10 Despite a legal decline of 
freedom of contract,11 about thirty years ago Charles Fried initiated a new focus 
on deontological readings of contract.12 From Fried’s “moralist of duty” 
perspective, “breaking [a] promise is wrong.”13 There is “a general obligation to 
keep promises, of which the obligation of contract will be only a special case—
that special case in which certain promises have attained legal as well as moral 
force.”14 Promissory contract theory renewed its ethical underpinning as liberal 
Kantian theory.15 Contractual obligation springs from a pure act of private 
 
 7.  See infra Part V. 
 8.  See infra Part VI. 
 9.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
 10.  OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 289 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881). 
 11.  P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 569–779 (1979) (detailing the 
historical circumstances culminating in the “fall of freedom of contract”). 
 12.  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17, 19, 127 (1981). 
 13.  Id. at 17, 127. 
 14.  Id. at 17. 
 15.  See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 57–59 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (discussing Doctrine of Right). 
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autonomy. The promisor commits himself by his freedom of will. In continental 
“will theory” this background was always present;16 it was coined anew in the 
common law as contract as promise. The liberal promissory paradigm remains 
one of the most influential contract theories today.17 
The promissory theory of contract typically carries three implications. 
(1) Contracts emerge as private relation through at least one promise. (2) The 
normative force of promising springs from the free will of the promisor who 
voluntarily commits himself to perform the contract. (3) The law plays only a 
supportive role in enforcing pre-existing morally binding promises. In short, 
promissory theory implies privacy, self-obligation, and passive law. Promises 
precede law.18 
CONTRACT (PROMISE) > LAW 
The commitment of the contract is created by the intention of the promising 
party or parties, not the law. The normative power is encapsulated in the 
principle of private autonomy, which points to the Kantian version of the idea 
of freedom. Law serves only as a functional butler of the will complying with 
the wishes of his master. If the butler fails to comply, this disgraceful 
disobedience must be corrected. Along these lines, Seana Shiffrin denounced 
the “divergence” between the moral culture of promising and contract law 
practices.19 All three implications of the typical picture are challenged by recent 
promissory accounts of contract. 
Though deeply convinced of the private moral autonomy of promising, 
Shiffrin herself subverts the first implication of the privacy paradigm for 
contracts.20 “In creating a contract, the parties render public their efforts to 
manage morally their disparate interests, as well as the associated latent or 
emergent vulnerabilities this disparity may create or feed. Creation of a contract 
invites this relationship to be witnessed, recognized, and scrutinized by the 
public.”21 The promise is no longer in the sole hands of the parties, but involves 
 
 16.  Its most prominent proponent was FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE 
MODERN ROMAN LAW (William Holloway trans., Hyperion Press 1979) (1840). For the influence of 
Savigny on the common law, see chapter 6 of ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 
139–65 (1921), and Frederick Pollock, Dedication of FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT, at vi (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1881). 
 17.  The symposium Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, organized by Jeffrey 
M. Lipshaw, gathered most leading U.S. contract scholars. See Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: 
The Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 601–960 (2012). 
 18.  For a typical promissory account, see Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 916, 933 (1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)); see also Joseph 
Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 79 (Supp. 1972). 
 19.  Seana Valetine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 
(2007). For a dissenting reply, see Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 1, 9 (2007). 
 20.  Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 750–51. Yet it is certainly not Shiffrin’s intention to weaken the 
promissory account—something she blames others of doing in Promising, Intimate Relationships, and 
Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 484 (2008). 
 21.  Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 750. 
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the larger public. “The public has an interest in protecting parties from the 
consequences and harm caused by breaches that result from these 
vulnerabilities. Second, and more broadly, the reinforcement of equal status 
facilitated by promises takes on a political value when made public.”22 Shiffrin 
might restrain her idea of public interest to the mere protection of the moral 
culture of promising. Nonetheless, her construction opens the contract for 
public reasons.23 Upon becoming a contract, the promise transforms into a 
public relationship. 
The second, individualistic moral implication of most promissory theories 
was prominently criticized by Daniel Markovits.24 The core of contract for him 
is a “collaboration” for common ends. He agrees with the promissory 
mainstream that contract is “a special case of promise” and, as such, a 
“distinctive and freestanding fount of moral obligation.”25 Yet his normative 
basis is not individual freedom but “moral community grounded in mutual 
respect.”26 Drawing upon “Kant’s formula of the End in Itself,” Markovits 
develops a conception of “respectful community,” which has to be joined freely 
and requires shared ends.27 “[C]ontracts, like all promises, invoke shared ends 
through which the parties to them come to treat each other as ends.”28 Although 
developed using Kantian ideas, collaboration at least implies a more 
intersubjective construction. Sharing means communicating. The “pursuit of 
ends that [persons] adopt together” requires intense communication.29 In the 
end, the binding force of promises, like contracts, rests on communicative 
collaboration. It is unsurprising, then, that Markovits makes explicit reference 
to Hannah Arendt’s communitarian explanation of promise-keeping. For her, 
the binding force of promise springs “directly out of the will to live together 
with others in the mode of acting and speaking.”30 
Finally, Thomas Scanlon plainly prepares the deliberative field at the 
borders of promissory theory. For Scanlon, promises do not presuppose a social 
institution, notwithstanding that “the law of contracts obviously is such an 
institution.”31 The moral wrong in breaking a promise for him springs from 
 
 22.  Id. at 751. 
 23.  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican Response to 
Professor Shiffrin, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399, 404 (2008) (commenting on that aspect of 
Shiffrin’s work as “public airing of private relationships”). 
 24.  Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1449 (2004). 
 25.  Id. at 1448, 1421. 
 26.  Id. at 1438. 
 27.  Id. at 1429. For Kant, however, the “End in Itself” formula was not a self-standing moral 
system, but one formulation of the categorical imperative as general law of freedom. This relation is 
essential for Kant’s overall theory as laid down in his third antinomy in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE 
OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781). 
 28.  Markovits, supra note 24, at 1449. 
 29.  Id. at 1429. 
 30.  HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 246 (1958); see Markovits, supra note 24, at 
1435. 
 31.  Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 86, 99 (Peter 
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“what we owe to other people when we have led them to form expectations 
about our future conduct.”32 The promisee has a moral “‘right to rely’” on the 
promised performance in the absence of “special justification.”33 The 
enforcement of a contractual promise by the law is “morally permissible if a 
principle licensing this use is one that no one . . . could reasonably reject.”34 In 
accordance with the third implication of promissory contract theories, the 
priority of promise over law, Scanlon then elaborates certain substantive legal 
enforcement principles directly based on prior promising principles. Still, his 
general moral demand for contract law to be legitimate is independent of the 
morality of promising. Scanlon’s moral claim for each principle is to be 
“justifiable to others on terms they could not reasonably reject.”35 On that level 
of second-order normativity, promises do not precede the law. Instead, contract 
law and promises have to satisfy independently the procedural justification 
principle: what we owe to each other is giving reasons. 
III 
THE PLURAL CORE OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONS 
Most competing narratives to promissory theory are labeled as 
“conventionalism.” There is broad unanimity among scholars that the use of the 
words “I promise” requires linguistic conventions. Scholars diverge only over 
the ground of moral obligations that arise from promising. Deontologically 
laden promises clash with the focus on their social consequences. For the 
prototypical conventionalist, David Hume, promises have “no force antecedent 
to human conventions.”36 To become present in the social world, a will must be 
expressed by words or signs. “The expression being once brought in as 
subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise.”37 On 
this view, contracts, like promises, are “human inventions, founded on the 
necessities and interests of society.”38 At least on the conceptual level, contract 
as convention has a strong continental tradition stretching from Ulpian and 
Pufendorf to the French Civil Code.39 
 
Benson ed., 2001). 
 32.  Id. at 87. 
 33.  Id. at 97 (citing Neil MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I, 46 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, at 59 (1972)). 
 34.  Id. at 100. 
 35.  T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 189, 295–327 (1998) (mostly identical with 
Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990)). 
 36.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 516–25 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1793). 
 37.  Id. at 523. 
 38.  Id. at 519. 
 39.  DIGEST 2.14.1.3 (Ulpian), translated in THE CIVIL LAW (Samuel P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932); 
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL 
LAW I (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1682) (1673), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 15 (James Brown Scott ed., 1964); Code Civil [C.civ.] art. 1101 (Fr.). 
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Typical conventionalist contract theory reverses the promissory picture. 
Conventionalism implies sociality, utility, and active law: (1) contracts emerge as 
social conventions; (2) the classical normative reason for keeping the social 
convention of contracting is their utility for social interaction; and (3) law 
enables and constitutes contractual obligations. 
CONTRACT < LAW 
From a conventionalist view, a contract is constituted by the law. If one 
wishes to speak of a contractual “promise,” then this special promise is enabled 
by the legal rules concerning the formation of contracts. “[L]egal rules 
themselves are part of the social institution of promising.”40 Law could be even 
seen as the main social context and the most relevant practice of promising.41 
Contract as promise transforms to promise as contract. Law institutionalizes 
conventional regularities, for instance, in the rules of offer and acceptance.42 
Law constitutes the social forms in which contractual behavior becomes 
possible. 
As intellectual descendants of utilitarianism, the law and economics 
approach unsurprisingly is the most prominent conventionalist theory of 
contract law. On this view, it is not the emergence of the obligation, but the 
economic consequences of conventional rules that matter: “which system of 
promissory enforcement yields the maximum net social benefits from promise 
making?”43 To enable the private ordering forces of the market, the goal of 
welfare maximization requires legal enforcement of contracts.44 Economic 
analysis refines the abstract utilitarian background as calculable efficiency in 
allocating scarce resources.45 The legal convention of contract is obligatory 
because—and as long as—it serves the improvement of social welfare. As legal 
rules are considered to affect parties by influencing their incentives, law 
becomes an active instrument to regulate the conventional patterns of behavior. 
Yet efficiency and utility are not the only values on which a conventionalist 
contract theory might be grounded. The core of conventionalism is not its close 
 
 40.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1110 (2001). 
One could even argue that Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 742, indirectly supports this claim with her 
argument (that is, that legal practices will have a bad influence on the moral culture of promising). 
 41.  See P. S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 127, 138–76 (1981) (explaining the social 
relationship between law and promise, and using examples to illustrate this interaction). 
 42.  See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 489, 503 (1989) (arguing that promissory theories could not explain the concrete 
substance of agreement rules like offer and acceptance and background rules defining the scope of the 
obligation). 
 43.  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1264 (1980). 
 44.  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE 
L.J. 541, 556 (2003); Oliver E. Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
438, 438–39 (2002). 
 45.  For a pure efficiency-based account of contracting, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 101 (5th ed. 1998) and his leading opinion in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 
769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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relation to social utility but a public two-stage construction. On the first level, 
there is the conventional social rule of contracting or promising guiding the 
corresponding action of the parties. “Convention” here means nothing more 
than temporarily stabilized regularities of social behavior.46 These regularities 
are purely empirical and might change over time. Yet the conventional rules of 
promising and contracting have been culturally stabilized for thousands of 
years. The second stage concerns normative motivation: why and to what extent 
the convention should be followed. For Hume, the normative motivation was 
utility, whereas recent alternatives point to reliance or the prevention of harm.47 
The constructive core of conventionalism is open for pluralism. Michael 
Trebilcock, himself a law and economics scholar, considers inherently pluralistic 
conceptions even more attractive. For him, efficiency alone merely leads to an 
“unstable equilibrium” of contract theory.48 
The plural core of conventionalism is fully revealed in John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice, where he unfolds the two-stage model for the convention of 
promising.49 Promises uttered in accordance with a “constitutive convention” 
are mere “bona fide promises.”50 Only a distinct “principle of fidelity” requires 
that these bona fide promises “are to be kept.”51 For Rawls, the moral 
obligation in the principle of fidelity is rooted in his principle of fairness. 
However, he concedes that the adoption of principles in his hypothetical 
original position is undetermined. The normative basis of the obligation is 
nothing but a “hypothetical agreement.”52 In reality, there might be plural or 
even conflicting principles regarding the source and scope of contractual 
obligations. In that circumstance, 
[t]he correct moral decision is the one most in line with the dictates of this system of 
principles when it is applied to all the facts it deems to be relevant. Thus the reason 
identified by one principle may be supported, overridden, or even canceled (brought 
to naught) by reasons identified by one or more other principles.
53
 
Conventionalism enters deliberative ground. 
 
 46.  DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION 51 (1969). 
 47.  See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 96 (1974) (reading contract law as a special 
case of tort law); P.S. Atiyah, Contract, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LAW Q. REV. 193 
(1978) 
 48.  MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 244–49 (1993) 
(advocating a perspective that supplements efficiency with some aspects of individual freedom). But see 
Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 
11 PHIL. ISSUES 420 (2001) (giving strict normative priority to individual freedom, in contrast with 
Trebilcock’s perspective). 
 49.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 344–50 (1971). 
 50.  Id. at 346. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 350. 
 53.  Id. at 348. 
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IV 
DELIBERATIVE CONTRACT LAW 
One major challenge of our globalized world is fundamental legal and 
ethical pluralism. The recent developments in both promissory theory as well as 
conventionalism could be read as deliberative efforts to cope with pluralism. 
Shiffrin’s public interest, Markovits’s collaboration, and Scanlon’s reasonable 
expectations share a movement towards public justification. But promises stress 
the subjective origin of contract in private autonomy. The promissory account, 
therefore, has an inherent problem with collective values, whereas social 
conventions are naturally akin to more collective values. Conventionalism is 
communicative and public but was traditionally linked to utilitarian ethics. 
Trebilcock’s unstable equilibrium, as well as Rawls’s hypothetical agreement, 
acknowledges more pluralistic ethical foundations. A conventionalist 
construction of contract could easily integrate plural social values, but it cannot 
easily accommodate the deontological claim of private autonomy. 
A newer camp of scholars offers genuine pluralistic multi-value theories of 
contract law.54 “Pluralism in contract law” urges judges to identify a range of 
plural values, consider plural reasons in ranking them, and construe the contract 
in light of those values and reasons.55 Here, the relation between contract and 
law remains unclear. Furthermore, many legal voices insist that if pluralist 
theories are “urging courts to pursue efficiency, fairness, good faith, and the 
protection of individual autonomy,” they “need, but so far lack, a meta-
principle that tells which of these goals should be decisive when they conflict.”56 
This plea for a meta-principle, however, does not take value pluralism seriously. 
In a pluralistic world, ethical values collide with each other day by day. 
Ethical-value pluralism is an empirical fact, as well as a normative necessity, of 
modern societies.57 Ethical values denotes every normative principle evaluating 
individual or social actions. Ethical pluralism posits foundationally independent 
values without preset hierarchies that could all conflict with each other.58 Plural 
values are incommensurable insofar as they are irreducible and thus could not 
be ranked in a universal manner. Yet they are comparable insofar as collective 
choice and deliberation require the possibility of weighing them in concrete 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
206, 240 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); JOHN WIGHTMAN, CONTRACT: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY (1996). 
 55.  Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1041 (2010). 
 56.  Schwartz & Scott, supra note 44, at 543. 
 57.  One classical formulation for a foundational conflict of values between liberty and equality is 
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
 58.  See, e.g., JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993) (discussing the implications of 
moral disintegration resulting from pluralism); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL 
COMPLEXITY (1987) (exploring competing considerations in moral judgment that are often ignored). 
Whereas JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165–255 (1986) builds his pluralism on the 
foundational value of individual freedom. For a “structural pluralism” in contract theory based on 
Raz’s account of autonomy, see Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 19. 
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situations.59 Such a value pluralism rejects any general substantive meta-
principle. 
To resolve the challenge of value pluralism without lapsing into relativism, 
contract theory needs a deliberative grounding. Deliberation denotes a process 
of practical reasoning in which different positions, reasons, and counter-reasons 
are carefully analyzed and weighed against each other. To “deliberate” means 
to come to a common decision through an exchange of reasons. This concept 
first saw the light of day in political theory. A deliberative democracy commits 
to the respect of value pluralism and requires that, for political choices to be 
legitimate, they “must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, 
equal, and rational agents.”60 Subjective freedom is transformed into an 
intersubjective discourse. 
Regardless of whether the discursive procedure should aim for a full 
motivational consensus,61 a mere overlapping consensus,62 a pragmatic 
compromise,63 or just a reasonable disagreement,64 all of these deliberative 
standards are based on an open exchange of reasons. Explicit public 
justification is the touchstone for every deliberative theory. Its meta-principle is 
a meta-procedure. Within that procedure, a deliberative theory does not 
tolerate ethical totalities. Instead, absolute ethical values are transformed into 
relative (pro tanto) reasons in a common pluralistic discourse. Individual values 
become public reasons. Every real conflict of ethical rationalities, then, is 
“political,” because it is insoluble by individual moral reflection. The only way 
out remains public deliberation leading to a common political decision. A 
deliberative theory tries to be—as far as possible—neutral towards plural 
ethical rationalities. It only frames and structures the political process of 
balancing plural ethical reasons. A “deliberative rationality” aims to transcend 
different ethical cultures.65 
 
 59.  For the possibility of rational choice between irreducibly plural values, see BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) and MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND 
CONFLICTING VALUES (1990). For an extensive overview, see INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
 60.  Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1998); See also 
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67, 72 
(James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., 1997); DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (Seyla Benhabib ed., 
1996). Even French poststructuralists link to a “deliberative” model of democracy. See, e.g., Jean-
François Lyotard, The Differend, in 46 THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE 1, 147 (Wlad Godzich 
& Jochen Schulte-Sasse eds., Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 1988). 
 61.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 116–194 
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) (1983). But see NICHOLAS RESCHER, 
PLURALISM AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS (L. Jonathan Cohen ed., 1993) (fundamentally 
criticizing Habermas’s consensual position). 
 62.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–72 (1993). 
 63.  Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum, in FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103 
(Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986). 
 64.  Thomas McCarthy, Legitimacy and Diversity, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1089 (1996). 
 65.  Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 
CONSTELLATIONS 26 (1994). 
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The essence of a deliberative theory of law is an open exchange of reasons 
in an impartial argumentative procedure. A deliberative theory establishes a 
procedural legal paradigm.66 Its core is neither substantive individual rights, like 
it would be under a liberal paradigm, nor the social public good as a 
communitarian paradigm would suggest. Instead, a deliberative paradigm 
focuses on the procedures of legal argumentation. Lawmaking, as well as every 
interpretation or application of legal norms, demands reasons. The application 
of a rule requires another rule of application and so forth.67 The rule paradox 
leads into a discursive space of reasons. Legal argumentation could be 
considered a special case of practical rational discourse.68 In legal discourse, the 
subjective interests of the parties, as well as public interests, could enter in the 
form of legal reasons. Statutes, precedence, custom, doctrines, and methods of 
interpretation all structure this public field of deliberation. 
A helpful theoretical tool to further analyze the legal discourse is the 
distinction between rules and principles. While legal rules compete in an all-or-
nothing fashion, legal principles can apply simultaneously and have a dimension 
of weight.69 Colliding principles have to be weighed against each other. That 
balancing of principles is the nucleus of a deliberative picture of law. Legal 
principles denote, of course, not absolute values, but relative (pro tanto) 
reasons. Whereas legal rules institutionalize argumentative structures of the 
balancing process,70 legal principles conceptualize the ethical deep layer of every 
legal action. They are only explicitly discussed in hard cases. But every legal 
decision could be reconstructed as a balancing process between colliding 
principles. 
Each legal conflict involves a collision of underlying principles. For instance, 
in the case of a drafting error the “will principle” clashes with a “reliance 
principle” in the wrongly written text. The basic rule of the English common 
law is that 
[i]f, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable 
man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and 
that other party upon that belief enters into a contract with him, the man thus 
conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other 
party’s terms.
71
 
 
 66.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 388–446 (William Regh trans., 1996) 
(1992). 
 67.  See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201, at 81 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1953) and the skeptical interpretation in SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON 
RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982). 
 68.  See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (Ruth Adler & Neil 
MacCormick trans., 1989) (1978). 
 69.  Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1967); Robert Alexy, 
On the Structure of Legal Principles, 13 RATIO JURIS 294, 294–97 (2000). 
 70.  For a discussion of how rules could structure the balancing of legal principles, see ROBERT 
ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 44–110 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002) (1985). 
 71.  Smith v. Hughes, (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 (Blackburn, C.J.) (U.K.). 
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This rule of objective appearance formulates a conditional priority of the 
reliance principle over the will principle for the situation of drafting errors. The 
conditions set out in the rule guide the balancing of colliding principles. Legal 
doctrines like mistake or misrepresentation denote the conditions under which 
the drafter could dispute the contract.72 
Legal rules formulate abstract conditional priorities between colliding 
principles. Yet the concrete balancing happens in each case. The judge analyzes 
the factual and normative context and decides. Ideally, she could reveal the 
conflicting normative reasons—for instance, a will principle based on private 
autonomy and a reliance principle based on a communitarian theory oriented 
towards social stability. She could reflect on their intensity and depreciation in 
the concrete case. Her decision implies a concrete ranking of the colliding 
principles for the given factual and normative situation of the case. In the legal 
proceeding, the parties offer reasons for different balancing outcomes. Legal 
rules structure that process by determining the burden of reasoning. In the 
aforementioned case of a contractual drafting error, the basic “objective 
appearance” rule gives priority to the reliance principle. The burden of 
reasoning why the will principle should nevertheless prevail under the special 
circumstances of the case falls on the drafter. 
Legal principles do not spring from a neutral legal nowhere, but from plural 
ethical backgrounds of legislators, judges, law professors, attorneys, and the 
parties. Legal principles could be read as ethical reasons. Law only formulates a 
specific discursive grammar for the ongoing and unavoidable social ethical 
conflicts. Each legal rule structures the deliberative process of balancing ethical 
principles. Yet the legal structure never ultimately determines a specific 
outcome. Beyond legislative actions, each legal interpretation and application is 
political as it always demands an open deliberation between plural reasons. 
Legal rules are not stock politics. Every legal decision breathes some political 
air. Apart from legislation and cases, judicial doctrines also determine the 
argumentative structures of deliberation. Doctrinal quarrels, like the question 
of due consideration in contract law, could be understood as political disputes 
over the abstract weight of conflicting ethical values. A deliberative theory of 
law aims to enlighten and reconstruct the ethical underpinnings of legal statutes 
and decisions. 
A deliberative theory of contract law aims to transcend the plural ethical 
narratives of contract and integrate them into one procedural legal framework. 
Different contract theories attribute the ethical source of the contractual 
obligation to different principles. Each monistic ethical principle offers a 
comprehensive account of contract and contract law. That is why the 
interpretation of contract law is determined by the ethical perspective that 
underpins it. A deliberative theory of contract law integrates plural ethical 
 
 72.  See, e.g., Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd, (1932) A.C. 161 (common mistake); Hartog v. Colin & 
Shields, (1939) 3 All E.R. 566 (unilateral mistake); Derry v. Peek, (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 (fraudulent 
misrepresentation). 
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principles into one normative system. Each principle represents only one 
deliberative reason, which has to be weighed against other reasons. 
Deliberation qualifies the ethical commitment of each reason yet does not 
annul its normative force. Each deliberative reason remains an ethical 
guarantor for the binding force of contract. The deliberative picture of contract 
law follows a procedural legal paradigm. Contract law institutionalizes the 
procedural framework for the deliberation of conflicting ethical reasons. 
Given this deliberative legal paradigm without any dominating values, does 
anything remain that can provide a solid normative basis of contract? One 
pluralist answer posits a contract “without a core.”73 In a coreless contract 
theory “there is no one idea that encapsulates the sine qua non of contract, no 
nodal point from which all the instantiations of the institution of contract 
flow.”74 Any contractual goals could be relevant at any given time, and “only 
particularistic argumentation could establish that any individual goal should 
take precedence for a given contract problem.”75 Such pluralistic anarchy risks 
lapsing into relativism and arbitrariness. That is why the deliberative theory of 
contract law outlines a distinct procedural legal framework. Yet the question 
remains as to what special role a contract could play in this procedural legal 
paradigm. What does a deliberative core of contract look like? 
V 
DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT IN COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES 
Contracts are communication. In a colloquial sense, that assertion is in no 
way surprising. Everybody would agree that the parties communicate with each 
other during the formation of a contract. Yet a deliberative contract theory 
builds on a more extensive idea of communicative action. Communicative 
action, as opposed to strategic action, aims for a common understanding of 
social reality.76 Each communicative act fulfills a double function. Apart from 
generating or transferring information, it claims validity and intersubjective 
recognition. This claim for recognition establishes a special commitment 
between the communicating subjects. If being criticized, the speaker has to cash 
in his claim with good reasons in a rational discourse. Prima facie, the 
committing effect of communicative action is based on potential reasons. 
Against this theory of rational discourse, social conventions transform into 
communicative practices. Conventional regularities could be pragmatically 
 
 73.  Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 917, 923, 926 
(2012). 
 74.  Id. at 923. 
 75.  Id. at 927. 
 76.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 273–337 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981). However, still 
skeptical towards legal institutions at that time, Habermas considers contracts to be mainly a medium 
for strategic action. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: 
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM 199–300 fig. 37 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981). 
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reformulated as discursive commitments in ongoing language games.77 
Conventional commitments become inferential in discursive practices.78 A 
discursive practice is every mutual interpretation of each other’s assertions: “At 
the core of the discursive practice is the game of giving and asking for 
reasons.”79 At least in our Western tradition, this reasoning game plays a 
principal role in the multiplicity of language games: “The fundamental sort of 
move in the game of giving and asking for reasons is making a claim—
producing a performance that is propositionally contentful, in that it can be the 
offering of a reason, and reasons can be demanded for it.”80 Within the practice 
of reasoning, the discursive players have commitments and entitlements. With 
every communicative action, the speaker commits himself to give reasons for his 
communicative claim when it is challenged and he entitles everybody to 
challenge him. 
Not only does the game of offer and acceptance amount to a communicative 
action, each communicative conduct within a contractual framework amounts to 
communicative actions. A contractual promise makes explicit the normally 
implicit claim for recognition in every communicative act. A contract reflects 
explicitly its own social commitment. In case of conflicts, objections, or 
irregularities, this expressive prima facie obligation entails the commitment to 
deliver reasons within a special discursive practice, which will normally be the 
law. Defaults demand justification. Contracts open an explicit door into the 
realm of discursive interaction. Contract law normally facilitates this contractual 
discourse. A deliberative contract theory enfolds contract as a discursive 
institution between law and a plurality of ethical reasons. 
CONTRACT — LAW 
\                   / 
REASONS 
The anticipation of ethical reasons allows for a prima facie commitment in 
the moment of contract formation. The contract establishes a special 
communicative relation between the contracting parties with discursive rights 
and duties. A contract constitutes a distinct discursive relation. The relational 
moment in contract is not tied to some sort of substantive cooperation,81 but is 
based on the ongoing discursive collaboration. By creating discursive 
entitlements, contracts build their own deliberative framework. Legal systems 
 
 77.  For a pragmatic reading of Wittgenstein, see WILFRID SELLARS, EMPIRICISM AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Harvard Univ. Press 1997) (1956); Wilfrid Sellars, Some Reflections on 
Language Games, 21 PHIL. SCI. 204 (1954); see also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M. 
Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) (pointing in a similar 
direction). 
 78.  ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT 158 (1994). 
 79.  Id. at 159. 
 80.  Id. at 141. 
 81.  As the relational theory of contract suggests. See IAN  MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY 
OF CONTRACT (David Campbell ed., 2001) (including a selection of Macneil’s works with introductions 
by recent relational contract scholars David Campbell, Jay Feinmann, and Peter Vincent-Jones). 
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then institutionalize procedures for cashing in the discursive commitments in 
contract law. Contract law is a specific discursive formation that occurs with 
contractual reasoning. Contracts emerge against the background of existing 
national, international, and transnational contract laws. Laws shape the form of 
contracts. Contracts facilitate the transition from social conflicts to legal 
argumentation. 
A contractual relation stabilizes itself as reflexive form, which channels 
transitions to reasoned deliberation. The discursive seed blooms in the 
argumentative structures of a legal system. Yet transnational business contracts 
in particular often establish an independent system for conflict resolution. The 
autonomy of the discursive system of a contract becomes fully obvious in 
complex contractual networks.82 However, the sales contract at the bakery next 
door also sets up an autonomous discursive system. The accepted order of bread 
for the next evening implies a discursive commitment and constitutes a 
discursive relation. In case of conflict, it will guide the deliberation. If the bread 
fails to be there the following evening, the customer will first face the baker and 
ask for reasons. He might be more satisfied with a shortfall of supply or an 
accident than with the answer that another customer just offered a higher price 
for the last remaining bread. In the latter case, a compassionate judge might 
indeed award him expectation or reliance damages, whereas in a similar 
business case he would opt for simple restitution. However, the deliberative 
account is not limited to distinct contract types.83 The outcomes may differ, but 
the underlying deliberative core always remains the same. 
Such an inferential reading of contract as deliberation directly affects its 
legal interpretation. Contracts do not represent the intentions of the parties. 
Neither do they just enact an established social convention. Contracts infer their 
meaning from the communicative actions of the parties. There are fundamental 
differences between these readings. The first version views contract as a mere 
tool in the hands of the parties. The judge tries to figure out what the real 
intention of the parties might have been. The second immediately applies an 
objective interpretation. The judge reads the contract in light of reasonable 
business customs. The deliberative account acknowledges that the contract is a 
genuine discursive system of meaning production.84 
Following the deliberative legal paradigm, the court delivers its own 
interpretation, explicitly deliberating on its premises and reasons. Yet there are 
 
 82.  See GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS 145–78 (Michelle Everson 
trans., 2011) (2004). 
 83.  There is a considerable plea to apply different theoretical accounts for distinct contract types, 
not only between law and economics scholars who focus on business contracts, see Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 44, but also as a general pluralist strategy. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and 
Remedies, and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 195 (2008) (asserting 
“that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, 
universal theory of Contract Law”). 
 84.  The quality of contract as an emergent system is stressed in the functional tradition of systems 
theory. See Dan Wielsch, Relational Justice, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 191. 
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two more substantive ideas that spring from a deliberative reading of contract. 
The court considers the subsequent communication of the parties within its 
contract interpretation. And it tries to uphold the contract as a communicative 
framework (favor contractus).85 The substantive contractual obligations might 
change, but the contract remains as a viable discursive core. A practical 
consequence of that deliberative reading is, for instance, a duty to renegotiate 
and adapt the contract to a change of circumstances. 
VI 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE OF REASONS 
Up to this point, a skeptic might criticize deliberative contract theory as a 
rather conventional story. The normative core of contract is the social practice 
of giving and asking for reasons. Each promise is embedded in an ongoing 
discursive practice of reasoning. But the inferential reformulation of 
conventionalism is not merely an exercise in repackaging. Instead of an 
objective convention, the idea of discursive practices focuses on the active 
intersubjective procedure of deliberating reasons. There is a hidden promissory 
twist in that deliberative contract narrative. A conventionalist theory could not 
explain the fact of prima facie commitments by promising. Once the contract is 
established as reflective discourse between the parties, it receives normative 
backing from the game of reasoning itself. Yet the constitutional moment of 
contracting is the blind spot of conventionalism. 
The creation of a contract requires a performative act. Every 
communicative action has a performative dimension. The speech act of 
promising articulates the contractual commitment expressively. It shares the 
foundational paradox of law itself—the “mystical foundation of authority.”86 A 
“performative tautology or a priori synthesis . . . structures any foundation of 
the law upon which one performatively produces the conventions that 
guarantee the validity of the performative.”87 A successful foundation of 
contract, as well as of law, will produce “the discourse of its self-legitimation.”88 
The foundational parallel between contract and the law becomes obvious in 
international treaties and the philosophical idea of social contract. “A 
foundation is a promise. . . . And even if a promise is not kept in fact, iterability 
inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation.”89 
Every legal foundation shares a promissory moment in its constitution. 
 
 85.  See Bertram Keller, Favor Contractus: Reading the CISG in Favor of the Contract, in SHARING 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 247–48 (Camilla B Andersen 
& Ulrich G Schroeter eds., 2008). 
 86.  Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
921 (Mary Quintance trans., 1990). 
 87.  Id. at 987. 
 88.  Id. at 993. 
 89.  Id. at 997. 
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Understanding the promise as discursive commitment dissolves the mystery. 
A contractual promise is not one, but two promises. On one level, a substantive 
promise determines the substance of future contract performance. On a second 
level, a discursive promise guarantees reasons for the range and the limits of the 
commitment. Contracts do not only incorporate substantive content, they also 
reflect their own validity. As a result, contracts commit and shape future 
communication. Contractual parties could cash in their discursive promises in 
informal negotiations with each other, as well as in legal discourses. Legal 
systems institutionalize procedures in which discursive promises can be 
enforced. If the parties cannot find a deliberative compromise, the judge 
decides. Yet the legal decision must acknowledge and weigh the diverse reasons 
in play. Contracts open discursive passages between the communication of the 
parties and the legal discourse. 
A contract is neither promissory obligation nor conventional commitment. 
It is both. A contract is a discursive institution that promises further reasons. 
One party transfers a discourse right to the other party requesting reasons 
whenever irregularities in performance occur. The explicit right to justification 
constitutes the discursive justification relation between the contractual parties. 
A right to justification establishes a second-order morality that demands the 
reciprocal and universal exchange of reasons.90 The contract remains a special 
relationship between promisor and promisee. Only the reasons take part in the 
public game of justification. The deontological core of contract is a discursive 
promise of reasons. Thus, each contractual partnership involves a second-order 
contract establishing a special justification relation.91 
One could even read Section 2 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in 
this sense: “A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from 
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that 
a commitment has been made.”92 Contractual promises open an expressive 
justification relation with the discursive commitment to give reasons if 
requested. Contracts install a communicative basis that is always built upon in 
the future of the contractual relation. By promising future reasons in a 
communicative relation, a contract creates its own discursive system. Thus, 
contracts are able to frame the paradox of every constitutional moment. In 
setting discursive rights, contracts act as constitutions.93 The genuine 
performative force of contractual promises is their expressive character: “The 
 
 90.  Rainer Forst, The Basic Right to Justification, 6 CONSTELLATIONS 35 (1999); see generally THE 
RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION (Amy Allen ed., Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2011) (2007). 
 91.  For the idea of second-order contract, see NIELS A. ANDERSEN, PARTNERSHIPS: MACHINES 
OF POSSIBILITY 97–110 (2008). Yet he defines this partnership as a special new type of contract, which 
deviates from normal one-order contracts. 
 92.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 93.  For the constitutional function of contract from a system theoretical perspective, see Gunther 
Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The Hybridization of Contract, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 51, 67–71 
(2007); see also Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 399, 412–14 (2000). 
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beauty of promise and contract is its explicitness.”94 They make explicit the 
second-order right to discursive justification. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
In a world of fundamentally plural values and principles, every decision is 
political. Contract theory and contract law are intrinsically pluralistic 
endeavors. An integrated pluralist theory of contract needs a second-order 
normativity. The deliberative political theory offers such a pragmatic 
procedural framing. Law offers an argumentative grammar for practical 
discourse about social conflicts. A deliberative reading of contract law makes 
explicit the ethical reasons that underpin legal argumentation about contractual 
conflicts. Absolute ethical values transform into comparable reasons. The only 
deliberative ideology is a belief in the power of reasons, that social conflicts can 
be resolved through rational deliberation. Legal decisions are not determined 
by strict ethical principles. Deliberative decisions are nevertheless not arbitrary. 
They are based on legally structured political argumentation. 
With its expressive discursive entitlements, the communicative form 
“contract” opens the door to the public space of reasons. A contract does not 
only imply a validity claim like every other communicative action, it makes 
explicit and reflects its commitment. In addition to a substantive promise, it 
entails a second discursive promise, which constitutes a discursive relation, even 
an independent discursive system. Thus, contracts dissolve the paradox of social 
commitment in a discursive circle between contract, law, and reasons. This 
circle is not a vicious one. From an inferential perspective it is not desirable to 
escape circularity. On the contrary, a circular exchange of reasons remains the 
only fruitful mode of living together in an age of fundamental pluralism. The 
procedural hermeneutics of reasonable deliberation transform the circle of law 
and promise into a happy discursive spiral. 
Given that deliberative pluralist conception of contract, the public 
dimension of contract becomes obvious. Public reason does not violate a 
contract or endanger otherwise free-floating promises. Rather, every contract 
has an intrinsic public dimension. Only the process of public justification 
nourishes the contractual commitment. Thus, contracts are inherently public 
institutions built on morally relevant, subjective promises of reasons. This 
justificatory picture of contract embraces both the conventionalist and the 
promissory construction as two sides of the same coin. Contractual 
communication produces a new understanding between the parties. Contracts 
build communicative communities. Open deliberation of normative conflicts is 
the day-by-day political reality of these contractual communities. 
Deliberative theory does not turn contract law into public law. In an 
increasingly global society, quite the opposite occurs. Contracts constitute the 
 
 94.  Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 250 (1986). 
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everyday law of transnational transactions and relations. Contracts are the 
basic, yet private, motors of global constitutionalism.95 Here, the theoretical 
construction of contract-as-deliberation charts a course between private- and 
public-law debates. Contract as deliberation opens a new field for social 
contractualism. The social sphere of law forms—but does not create—contracts. 
Every contract initiates a justification relation between the partners of the 
contract. Every contract is private and public at the same time. The private 
promise of reasons must be redeemed in an open deliberation with public 
reasons. The discursive commitments in contracts generate social legitimacy. 
Contracts are the smallest, but most common, deliberative institutions of 
society. Every contract is a social contract. 
 
 
 95.  For a version of global constitutionalism taking the role of private law seriously, see  
GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS (2012). 
